Qualia and Consciousness

Christopher Altman 
Pierre Laclede Honors College

Consciousness – and the fundamental underlying process governing awareness – has proven itself to be one of the most complex and difficult problems facing science today. This arises in part from the fact that it is intrinsically difficult to quantify, due to its subjective nature. In examining the different arguments put forth to explain consciousness, one must filter through a virtual quagmire of conflicting perspectives, many of which show little to no concrete evidence to explain their validity. This is caused primarily by the inherent weakness of conflicting experimental results, which are themselves limited by the inadequacy of our current technological ability to illuminate the complex functioning deep within the brain.

One problem with any theory of consciousness that gives its answer in terms of physical processing is that it neglects to address how these processes give rise to conscious experience. Even a fully testable theory of neural correlates of consciousness – if indeed one is found – does not cross the explanatory gap between function and experience. Crick and Koch propose that consciousness arises from neural resonance in the frontal cortex. This fails, however, to define the subjectivity of experience. Why are these physical processes necessarily accompanied by a sense of self-awareness?

Due to its very foundations of objectivity, science is at a loss when attempting to encompass subjective phenomena. Philosopher David Chalmers has proposed that consciousness may not be reducible to physical interactions at all – but may be better understood by viewing it as fundamental. Just as gravity and spacetime are fundamental properties within physics, consciousness, by analogy, may play an equivalent role in neuroscience. New theories may be concerned with discovering a set of simple and fundamental laws to bridge the gap between physical interaction and subjective experience.

Further Readings in Philosophy and Neuroscience 

David Chalmers
Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona

Computation and Neural Systems Program
Francis Crick and Christof Koch, California Institute of Technology